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Abstract
An increasing number of central banks implement monetary policy via a
channel system or a floor system. We construct a general equilibrium model
to study the properties of these systems. We find that a floor system is weakly
optimal if and only if the target rate satisfies the Friedman rule. Unfortunately,
the optimal floor system requires either transfers from the fiscal authority to
the central bank or a reduction in seigniorage payments from the central bank
to the government. This is the unpleasant fiscal arithmetic of a floor system.
When the central bank faces financing constraints on its interest expense, we
show that it is strictly optimal to operate a channel system.
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1 Introduction
Over the past years, a monetary policy framework known as a channel or corridor
system has been implemented by several central banks and is being considered by
other central banks.1 In this system, a central bank operates two facilities: a lending
facility and a deposit facility. At the lending facility, the central bank stands ready
to supply money overnight to financial intermediaries at a given borrowing rate, ,
against collateral. At the deposit facility, intermediaries can make overnight deposits
at the central bank to earn the interest rate   , where the spread is called the
interest rate corridor or channel. This simple framework immediately raises three
questions. First, why provide these facilities? Second, why choose a positive corridor
as opposed to a zero corridor? Third, what is the optimal value of ? We construct
a general equilibrium model of standing facilities to help answer these questions.
Why do we consider a general equilibrium model? The typical answers to the
questions above are based on partial equilibrium analysis, which we find incomplete.
The usual answer to the first question is that the standing facility provides an outside
option for intermediaries who, for whatever reason, were unable to execute desired
trades in the money market. In this sense, the central bank is "completing" the money
market by providing liquidity insurance to intermediaries. However, whenever insur-
ance is provided, there may be incentive problems that lead to ineﬃcient outcomes.
Thus, is it optimal to provide this insurance? The answer to this question requires a
general equilibrium model with a well-defined objective for the central bank.
The typical answer to the second question is that a positive corridor gives interme-
diaries an incentive to trade amongst themselves rather than accessing the standing
facilities. By exploiting gains from trade, intermediaries move the market rate, ,
inside the corridor; i.e.,     . This allows the central bank to control the
money market rate by either changing the width of the corridor or shifting it with
the goal of keeping the money market interest rate close to its target.2
1Channel systems are widely used in practice; see Bernhardsen and Kloster (2010). Versions
are, for example, implemented by the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central
Bank (ECB), the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Swiss National Bank, the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, and the U.S. Federal Reserve System.
2In theory, there is no need for direct central bank intervention to control the market rate of
interest, since money market participants will never mutually agree to trade at an interest rate
that lies outside the interest rate corridor. In practice, central banks still conduct open market
operations to adjust the quantity of central bank money in circulation. In "normal" times, they do
so to accommodate, for example, seasonal fluctuations in the demand for central bank money. In
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A floor system is a special case where  = , which can easily be achieved by
setting  =  = , i.e., by setting the channel width to zero. This would give the
central bank perfect control of the money market rate. Thus, controlling the market
rate cannot be the reason for a positive spread. So, is there another reason for doing
so?
Finally, in general but more importantly for a floor system, what determines the
optimal value of ? The typical answer is that  is set at the "target" interest rate.
But what determines that rate? Are there restrictions that aﬀect the feasible set
of target rates? Again, the answers to these questions require a general equilibrium
model.
We use a Lagos-Wright monetary model with financial intermediation to study the
allocation of money/reserves. In this framework, we assume that some intermediaries
are randomly excluded from trading in the money market (i.e., exogenous market
segmentation). We then use our model to answer the three questions posed above.
We show that by choosing  =  = , i.e., with the use of a floor system, the
central bank can eﬀectively eliminate market segmentation and "complete" the money
market. We find that this is the optimal policy if the central bank can implement the
Friedman rule, which involves paying interest at the deposit facility that compensates
for the time cost of holding reserves.
If the Friedman rule cannot be implemented, then it is optimal to do two things.
First, set the deposit rate as high as feasible (get as close to the Friedman rule
as possible). Second, run a corridor system by setting   . By increasing the
borrowing rate, the central bank "penalizes" intermediaries, who do not have suﬃcient
reserves if they are excluded from the money market. As a result, intermediaries
demand more reserves, which increases the real value of money/reserves and welfare.
This is a pecuniary general equilibrium eﬀect that is absent in partial equilibrium
analysis.
Why might it be infeasible for the central bank to implement the Friedman rule?
Under this rule, banks are satiated with reserves and they do not need to borrow
from each other or the central bank; yet, they will deposit excess reserves at the
central bank to earn the deposit rate. How is this interest expense financed? The
central bank can 1) print money, 2) use income from its asset holdings, or 3) receive
"exceptional" times, in response to severe aggregate shocks they do so to restore the functioning of
money markets.
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transfers from the fiscal authority. Most of the existing analysis ignores this question
and assumes that all of these options are suﬃcient. We argue in this paper that this
is not a trivial issue and clearly aﬀects the choice of a floor or corridor system.
Our results take into account the possibility that central banks may be unable,
or are unwilling for political reasons, to incur the interest expense required by the
optimal floor system. We argue that this possibility is relevant for the following
reasons:
(i) Using taxes to finance interest payments to banks may not be politically ac-
ceptable, since other areas of government spending may be aﬀected. As Feinman
(1993) documents, the Federal Reserve long requested the power to pay interest on
reserves only to be denied this on budgetary grounds. To illustrate the political op-
position, consider the following Congressional testimony by a U.S. Treasury oﬃcial
on the proposal to pay interest on reserves:
"As a general matter we are sympathetic to many of the arguments
put forth by the proponents, particularly with regards to monetary policy.
At the same time, however, we are also mindful of the budgetary costs
associated with this proposal which would be significant. The President’s
budget does not include the use of taxpayer resources for this purpose.
At this time, then, the Administration is not prepared to endorse that
proposal."3
(ii) Interest payments on reserves are quantitatively important. The Federal Re-
serve’s Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) generated $1.5 trillion in reserves at the
end of 2012, and they are projected to be over $2.5 trillion if the latest LSAP continue
to 2014. Analysis of the Fed’s balance sheet by Federal Reserve economists suggest
that the interest expense for locking up reserves in the banking system could top
$60 billion for a couple of years under a plausible scenario of rising interest rates.4
In this scenario, the analysis also shows that remittances to the Treasury would be
zero for more than five years. To highlight the potential political backlash from
such large payments, note that according to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
3March 13, 2001: Special House Hearing related to H.R. 1009. Statement by Donald V. Ham-
mond, Acting Under Secretary for Domestic Finance, Department of the Treasury. The proposal
was not approved.
4See Carpenter et al. (2012). For an other recent estimate of the potential costs with probabilities
attached to it, see also Christensen et al. (2013)
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(FDIC) data, the combined net income of the top 10 U.S. banks in 2010 was less than
$55 billion. Furthermore, Federal Reserve H.8 data at the end of 2012 shows that
nearly half of all reserves are held by foreign banks, which suggests a transfer of U.S.
taxpayer resources to foreign banks in the neighborhood of $30 billion. In the current
populist environment confronting U.S. politicians, it is not unreasonable to conjec-
ture that Congress could respond to these large payments to domestic and foreign
banks by suspending or eliminating the Fed’s power to pay interest on reserves. This
would complicate the Fed’s strategy for shrinking its balance sheet while attempting
to keep inflation under control.
It is important not to confuse the (steady state) results of our model with current
short-run policies. In response to the financial crisis, several central banks have
moved from a corridor system toward a floor system, at least temporarily (see e.g.,
Bernhardsen and Kloster, 2010). Short-term interest rates are currently at a record
low. With the deposit rate close to zero, the fiscal implications of paying interest on
reserves are largely irrelevant. However, once the economy recovers and short-term
interest rates rise, the fiscal implications of a floor system will become relevant again,
particularly if central banks choose not to drain reserves prior to raising their policy
rates.
1.1 Related Literature
Despite the growing use of channel and floor systems to implement monetary policy,
only a few theoretical studies on their use exist. The earlier literature on channel
systems or aspects of channel systems were conducted in partial equilibrium models.5
Except for some non-technical discussions (e.g., Goodfriend, 2002, Keister et al., 2008,
and Bernhardsen and Kloster, 2010), there are no papers that compare floor versus
corridor systems in a general equilibrium model.
General equilibrium analysis is important because partial equilibrium analysis
can be misleading. For example Goodfriend (2002) argues that the central bank
can pay interest on reserves and always make a profit. This occurs by exploiting an
exogenously given, positively sloped yield curve — the central bank can issue short
maturity reserves and buy long maturity assets. The diﬀerence in returns is profit for
the central bank that gets returned to the Treasury. However, in general equilibrium,
5See, e.g., Campbell (1987), Ho and Saunders (1985), Orr and Mellon (1961), Poole (1968),
Furfine (2000), Woodford (2001), and Whitesell (2006).
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the yield curve is an endogenous object — one cannot simply assume it has a particular
slope. Furthermore, Goodfriend’s argument raises the following question: why not
exploit this ad infinitum to maximize revenue for the Treasury? In short, the central
bank should expand its balance sheet until the yield curve is flat.
Even if the yield curve is flat, it is feasible for the central bank to print money, ac-
quire interest-bearing assets and simply transfer the funds to financial intermediaries.
This looks as if there are no fiscal implications from running a floor system. How-
ever this is not the case. First, the interest income is being transferred to financial
intermediaries as opposed to the Treasury. This would then force the fiscal authority
to generate revenues in some other manner most likely from distortionary taxation.
Second, the initial assets that are purchased to earn income, are again, resources that
could have been transferred to the Treasury as ordinary seigniorage. Finally, albeit
less importantly, even with a cancellation of interest income with interest expense,
the central bank would still have operating costs that need to be covered via fiscal
transfers. The point of this discussion is to emphasize that general equilibrium mod-
els are more demanding in terms of what needs to be explained and what can be
taken as given.
General equilibrium models of channel systems are Berentsen and Monnet (2008),
Curdia andWoodford (2011), Martin andMonnet (2011), and Chapman et al. (2011),
where the latter two build on Berentsen and Monnet (2008). Our model also builds
on Berentsen and Monnet (2008), who analyze the optimal interest-rate corridor in
a channel system. In Berentsen and Monnet (2008), the central bank requires a real
asset as a collateral at its borrowing facility. Due to its liquidity premium, the social
return of the asset is lower than the private return to market participants. From a
social point of view, this results in an over-accumulation of the asset if the central bank
implements a zero interest-rate spread. It is, therefore, socially optimal to implement
a strictly positive interest-rate spread to discourage the wasteful over-accumulation
of collateral. In contrast, in our model the collateral is nominal government bonds,
and there is no waste involved in producing nominal government bonds.6 Our result,
therefore, that the constrained-eﬃcient monetary policy involves a strictly positive
interest-rate spread is due to a mechanism that is very diﬀerent from the one proposed
in Berentsen and Monnet (2008). Furthermore, several aspects of our environment,
6Like money, government bonds are essentially pieces of paper that are costless to produce and
so there is no social waste in their use.
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such as ex-post heterogeneity of money demand, diﬀers substantially from Berentsen
and Monnet (2008).
Martin and Monnet (2011) compare the feasible allocations that one can obtain
when a central bank implements monetary policy either with a channel system or via
open market operations. The focus of our paper is the floor system and the fiscal
implications of the optimal floor system. We also have a more complex structure
of liquidity shocks, which allows us to study how policy aﬀects the distribution of
overnight liquidity in a general equilibrium model. In Chapman et al. (2011) the
value of the collateral is uncertain. The focus in their paper is on the optimal haircut
policy of a central bank.
Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) study optimal policy in a New Keynesian frame-
work with financial intermediation. They also find that the floor system is optimal,
because it eliminates any ineﬃciencies associated with economizing reserves in the
banking system. Unlike our paper, they do not study fiscal restrictions of paying
interest on reserves. Furthermore, our paper diﬀers from Cúrdia and Woodford along
three additional dimensions. First, we do not have sticky prices. Second, we do not
have ineﬃciencies in the financial intermediation process that give rise to a need for
reserves. Our framework operates via a diﬀerent mechanism — a combination of risk
sharing, market segmentation and collateral requirements — none of which are present
in Cúrdia and Woodford. Finally, we address the question of whether or not it is op-
timal for the central bank to run the standing facilities in a way that eliminates the
eﬀects of market segmentation. This is not an issue for them because they assume
implementing the Friedman rule is fiscally feasible.
The structure of our paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the environment.
Section 3 characterizes optimal decisions by market participants. Section 4 studies
symmetric stationary equilibria. Section 5 identifies the optimal policy and discusses
its fiscal implications. Section 6 characterizes the second-best policy. Section 7 con-
tains some extensions of our model, and Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
2 Environment
Our framework is motivated by the functioning of existing channel systems. For
example, as discussed in Berentsen and Monnet (2008), the key features of the ECB’s
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implementation framework and of the euro money market are as follows. First, at
the beginning of the day, any outstanding overnight loans at the ECB are settled.
Second, the euro money market operates between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. Third, after
the money market has closed, market participants can access the ECB’s facilities for
an additional 30 minutes. This means that, after the close of the money market, the
ECB’s lending facility is the only possibility for obtaining overnight liquidity. Also,
any late payments received can still be deposited at the deposit facility of the ECB.
To reproduce the above sequence of trading, we assume that in each period three
perfectly competitive markets open sequentially (see Figure 1).7 The first market
is a settlement market, where agents can trade money for newly issued bonds and
all claims from the previous day are settled. The second market is a money market,
where agents can borrow against collateral and lend money to earn the money market
interest rate.8 The third market is a goods market, where agents trade goods for
money. At the beginning of the goods market the central bank opens a deposit
facility and a borrowing facility. At the deposit facility agents can deposit money
to earn the deposit rate, and at the borrowing facility they can get a loan against
collateral.
- shock          
Money Market 
interest rate im  
 - shock 
Settlement  
Market 
Standing Facility and Goods Market 
deposit rate id  
lending rate il
t t + 1 
Figure 1: Sequence of markets.
Time is discrete and the economy is populated by infinitely lived agents. There is
a generic good that is non-storable and perfectly divisible. Non-storable means that
it cannot be carried from one market to the next. There are two types of agents:
buyers and sellers. Buyers can only consume and sellers can only produce in the
goods market. Both agent types can produce and consume in the settlement market.
Each type has measure 1.
7Our environment builds on Berentsen and Monnet (2008) and Lagos and Wright (2005). The
framework by Lagos and Wright (2005) is useful because it allows us to introduce heterogeneous
preferences while still keeping the distribution of money balances analytically tractable.
8We assume that this market is competitive, although in the U.S. it is an over-the-counter
market, where banks trade bilaterally and form stable, long-term relationships (see Afonso et al.
(2013) for an empirical study). The assumption of competitive markets simplifies the analysis. For
an interesting model of pairwise trading in the money market, see Afonso and Lagos (2012).
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In the goods market, a buyer gets utility () from consuming  units of the
good, where () = log (), and  is a preference shock that aﬀects the liquidity
needs of buyers. The preference shock  has a continuous distribution  () with
support (0∞], is iid across buyers and serially uncorrelated.9 Sellers incur a utility
cost () =  from producing  units. The discount factor across periods is  =
(1 + )−1  1, where  is the time rate of discount.
In the settlement market, agents have a constant returns to scale production tech-
nology, where one unit of the good is produced with one unit of labor generating one
unit of disutility. Thus, producing  units of goods implies disutility −. Further-
more, we assume that the utility of consuming  units of goods yields utility . As
in Lagos and Wright (2005), these assumptions yield a degenerate distribution of
portfolios at the beginning of the goods market.10
The preference shock  creates random liquidity needs among buyers. They learn
it at the beginning of the money market and based on this information they can
adjust their money holdings by either accessing the money market or by using the
central bank’s standing facilities. If the money market rate lies strictly between
the central bank’s deposit and borrowing rates, buyers strictly prefer to adjust their
money holding in the money market, rather than at the central bank’s standing
facilities. To generate a role for these facilities, we assume that only a fraction of
buyers  can participate in the money market. Those buyers who have no access to
the money market can only use the central bank’s standing facilities to adjust their
money holdings. Finally, we assume that the deposit facility continues to be open
during the goods market, which allows the sellers to deposit the proceeds from their
sales to earn the deposit rate.
In practice, only qualified financial intermediaries have access to the money market
and the central bank’s standing facilities. Nevertheless, these intermediaries act on
the behalf of their customers: households and firms. We simplify the analysis by
assuming that the economy is populated by agents who have direct access to the
money market and the central bank’s standing facilities. This simplifies the analysis
9See also Berentsen and Rocheteau (2002, 2003) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) for a similar
characterization of the shocks.
10The idiosyncratic preference shocks in the goods market play a role similar to that of random
matching in Lagos and Wright (2005). Due to these shocks, buyers spend diﬀerent amounts of
money in the goods market, which yields a distribution of money holdings at the beginning of the
settlement market.
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and focuses on the varying liquidity needs of agents in the economy rather than the
process of intermediation.
2.1 Money and Bonds
There are two perfectly divisible financial assets: money and one-period, nominal
discount government bonds. New money and new bonds are issued in the settlement
market. Bonds are payable to the bearer and default-free. One bond pays oﬀ one
unit of currency in the settlement market of the following period. The central bank
is assumed to have a record-keeping technology over bond trades, and bonds are
book-keeping entries — no physical object exists. This implies that households are
not anonymous to the central bank. Nevertheless, despite having a record-keeping
technology over bond trades, the central bank has no record-keeping technology over
goods trades.11
Private households are anonymous to each other and cannot commit to honor
intertemporal promises. Since bonds are intangible objects, they are incapable of
being used as media of exchange in the goods market; hence they, are illiquid.12
Since households are anonymous and cannot commit, a household’s promise in the
goods market to deliver bonds to a seller in the settlement market of the following
period is not credible.13
In summary, agents are anonymous in the goods market and money is the only
tangible asset, which is recognizable in the goods market and can be used as a medium
of exchange.
11If the central bank had a record-keeping technology over goods trades, it could make this
information available to agents in the settlement market. This information could facilitate trade
credit in the decentralized market, which would render money inessential.
12Claims to collateral cannot be used as medium of exchange, since we assume that agents can
perfectly and costlessly counterfeit such claims, which prevents them from being accepted as a means
of payment in the goods market (see Lester et al. 2012).
13One can show that in our environment illiquid bonds are beneficial. We omit a proof and
simply assume it. However, it has been shown previously that it is socially beneficial for bonds to be
illiquid; see Kocherlakota (2003), Shi (2008), and Berentsen and Waller (2011). More recent models
with illiquid assets include, Lagos and Rocheteau (2008), Lagos (2010b), Lester et al. (2011), and
many others.
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2.2 Money Market and Standing Facilities
The money market is perfectly competitive so that the money market interest rate
 clears the market. Let  = 1 (1 + ). We restrict all financial contracts to
overnight contracts. An agent who borrows one unit of money in the money market
repays 1 units of money in the settlement market of the following period. Also, an
agent who deposits one unit of money receives 1 units of money in the settlement
market of the following period. Finally, borrowers need to post collateral. Our money
market is similar as the one in Berentsen et al. (2007). The purpose of the money
market is to reallocate money from buyers with a low marginal utility of consumption
to those with a high marginal utility. In particular, in this market no private claims
are issued that can circulate as payment instruments.14
At the beginning of the goods market, the central bank opens a borrowing facility
and a deposit facility. At these facilities, claims to a unit of money in the next
settlement market are traded. At the deposit facility, the central bank sells claims to
a unit of money in the next settlement market. At the borrowing facility, the central
bank buys claims to a unit of money in the next settlement market. Therefore, 
is the central bank’s ask price for these claims at the deposit facility and  is the
central bank’s bid price for these claims at the borrowing facility.
Intuitively, the borrowing facility oﬀers nominal loans  against collateral at in-
terest rate , and the deposit facility promises to pay interest rate  on nominal
deposits  with  ≥ . Let  = 1 (1 + ) and  = 1 (1 + ). An agent who
borrows  units of money from the central bank repays  units of money in the
settlement market of the following period. Also, an agent who deposits  units of
money at the central bank receives  units of money in the settlement market of
the following period.
2.3 Consolidated Government Budget Constraint
Let S denote the central bank’s surplus (S  0) or deficit (S  0) at time . It
satisfies
S =+ − + (1 − 1)− (1 − 1) (1)
14It can be shown that our money market is equivalent to a narrow banking system, where banks
can issue private notes that circulate as payment instruments but are required to hold 100 percent
reserves. See Berentsen et al. (2007) for more details.
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where  is the stock of money at the beginning of the current-period settlement
market and + the stock of money at the beginning of the next-period settlement
market.15 Since in the settlement market total loans, , are repaid and total deposits,
, are redeemed, the diﬀerence (1 − 1) − (1 − 1) is the central bank’s
revenue from operating the standing facilities.
In Section 7, we amend the central bank’s balance sheet (1) along two lines. First,
we endow the central bank with a stock of real assets that provides a stream of revenue
in each period. Here, we show that our analysis is unaﬀected if the real return on
these assets is not too high. Second, we endow the central bank with a stock of
government bonds that pay interest. We show that this is simply another way to
transfer tax revenue from the government to the central bank, since the government
has to levy taxes to finance the interest payments on the government bonds.
Let D =  −  denote nominal expenditure by the government, , minus the
government’s nominal tax collection,  . If D  0 (D  0), the government has a
primary surplus (deficit). The government’s budget constraint satisfies
D = + − + S (2)
where  is the stock of bonds at the beginning of the current-period settlement
market, + the stock of bonds at the beginning of the next-period settlement market
and  = 1 (1 + ) the price of bonds in the settlement market, where  denotes
the nominal interest rate on government bonds. The government budget constraint
simply requires that any primary deficit D  0 must be financed by either issuing
additional debt +−, central bank surplus S, or both. If S  0, there is a transfer
of funds from the government to the central bank. If S  0, the transfer is reversed.
The consolidated government budget constraint at time  is given by
D =+ − + (1 − 1)− (1 − 1) + + − (3)
Equation (3) states that the consolidated deficit must be financed by issuing some
combination of money and government bonds as in Sargent and Wallace (1981).16 In
15Throughout the paper, the plus sign is used to denote the next-period variables.
16Sargent and Wallace (1981) study the interactions of monetary and fiscal policy. In particular,
they argue that if fiscal policy dominates monetary policy, then monetary policy might not be able
to control inflation. We use the same consolidated government budget constraint as they do but
our focus is diﬀerent. We derive the fiscal implications of implementing monetary policy via either
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addition, the diﬀerence (1 − 1)− (1 − 1) is the central bank’s profit from
operating the standing facility.
In what follows, we simplify our analysis by assuming that  = 0, which implies
that D = − . Furthermore, we assume that  =  are lump-sum taxes (  0)
or lump-sum subsidies (  0). This simplification avoids distortionary taxation,
which we do not want to be the focus of this paper. Accordingly, if D = −  0,
the households receive a lump-sum money subsidy from the government; and if D =
−  0, the households pay a lump-sum tax to the government.
2.4 First-best Allocation
In this section, we characterize the optimal planner (i.e., first-best) allocation. The
optimal planner allocation requires neither money nor bonds, since the planner can
dictate the consumption and production quantities. We assume without loss in gen-
erality that the planner treats all sellers symmetrically. He also treats all buyers
experiencing the same preference shock symmetrically. Furthermore, he cares for
everyone’s utility equally. Given these assumptions, it can be shown that the first-
best allocation satisfies
∗ =  for all  (4)
∗ = ¯ ≡
Z ∞
0
 ()  (5)
These are the quantities chosen by a social planner who could dictate production and
consumption in the goods market.
3 Household Decisions
In this section, we study the decision problems of buyers and sellers in these markets.
For this purpose,  denotes the price of goods in the settlement market and let
 ≡ 1 . Furthermore, let  be the price of goods in the goods market.
a channel system or a floor system.
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3.1 Settlement Market
(    ) denotes the expected value of entering the settlement market with
 units of money,  bonds,  loans from the borrowing facility,  deposits at the
deposit facility, and  loans from the money market. ( ) denotes the expected
value from entering the money market with  units of money and  collateral. For
notational simplicity, we suppress the dependence of the value function on the time
index .
In the settlement market, the problem of an agent is
(    ) = max00− +  (
0 0)
 + 0 + 0 = + + +  −  −  − 
where  is hours worked in the settlement market,  is consumption of the generic
good,0 is the amount of money brought into the money market, and 0 is the amount
of bonds brought into the money market. Using the budget constraint to eliminate
−  in the objective function, one obtains the first-order conditions
 0 ≤  ( = if 0  0 ) (6)
 0 ≤  ( = if 0  0 ). (7)
 0 ≡  (00)0 is the marginal value of taking an additional unit of money into
the money market. Since the marginal disutility of working is one, − is the utility
cost of acquiring one unit of money in the settlement market.  0 ≡  (00)0 is
the marginal value of taking additional bonds into the money market. The term
− is the utility cost of acquiring one unit of bonds in the settlement market. The
implication of (6) and (7) is that all buyers enter the money market with the same
amount of money and the same quantity of bonds. The same is true for sellers, since
in equilibrium they will bring no money into the money market.
The envelope conditions are
  =   = ;  = ;  = −;  = − (8)
where   is the partial derivative of (   ) with respect to  =     .
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3.2 Money and Goods Markets
At the beginning of the money market, buyers observe their preference shock  and
learn whether they have access to the money market or not. We call a buyer who has
access to the money market an active buyer and a buyer who has no access to the
money market a non-active buyer. The indirect utility function of an −buyer in the
money market before access is determined is
( | ) = ( | ) + (1− )( | ) (9)
where ( | ) is the value of an active buyer at the beginning of the money market
and ( | ) is the value of a non-active buyer. Both values are determined further
below.
We next consider the problem solved by sellers, and then we study the decisions
by active and non-active buyers.
Decisions by sellers Sellers produce goods in the goods market with linear cost
 () =  and consume in the settlement market, obtaining linear utility () = . It
is straightforward to show that sellers are indiﬀerent as to how much they sell in the
goods market if
+ = 1 (10)
where + is the price of money in the next-period settlement market. Since we focus
on a symmetric equilibrium, we assume that all sellers produce the same amount.
With regard to bond holdings, it is straightforward to show that, in equilibrium,
sellers are indiﬀerent to holding any bonds if the Fisher equation holds and will hold
no bonds if the yield on the bonds does not compensate them for inflation or time
discounting. Thus, for brevity of analysis, we assume sellers carry no bonds across
periods.
Note that we allow sellers to deposit their proceeds from sales at the deposit
facility, which explains the deposit factor  in (10). Furthermore, it is also clear that
they will never acquire money in the settlement market and so for them 0 = 0.
Decisions by non-active buyers A non-active −buyer has access only to the
standing facilities of the central bank. The indirect utility function ( | ) of
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such a buyer is
( | ) = max  () +  (+  −  −    )
s.t. +  −  −  ≥ 0 and −  ≥ 0
where  is the deposit at the central bank and  is the loan received from the central
bank. The first inequality is the buyer’s budget constraint. The second inequality
is the collateral constraint. Let + denote the Lagrange multiplier for the first
inequality and + denote the Lagrange multiplier of the second inequality. Then,
using (8) to replace   ,   and   , the first-order conditions for , , and  can
be written as follows:
0 ()− + (1 + ) = 0
1 − (1 + ) ≤ 0 (= 0 if   0)
−1 + (1 + )−  ≤ 0 (= 0 if   0) 
(11)
Lemma 1 characterizes the optimal borrowing and lending decisions and the quan-
tity of goods obtained by a non-active −buyer:
Lemma 1 There exist critical values , , ¯, with 0 ≤  ≤  ≤ ¯, such that
the following is true: if 0 ≤   , a non-active buyer deposits money at the central
bank; if  ≤  ≤ , he neither borrows nor deposits money; if    ≤ ¯, he borrows
money and the collateral constraint is nonbinding; if ¯ ≤ , he borrows money and
the collateral constraint is binding. The critical values solve
 = +,  = +, and ¯ =  + +. (12)
Furthermore, the amount of borrowing and depositing by a non-active buyer with a
taste shock  and the amount of goods purchased by the buyer satisfy:
 = ,  =  ( − ) ,  = 0 if 0 ≤  ≤ 
 = ,  = 0,  = 0 if  ≤  ≤ 
 = ,  = 0,  =  ( − )  if  ≤  ≤ ¯,
 = ¯  = 0  =  if ¯ ≤ 
(13)
The optimal borrowing and lending decisions follow the cut-oﬀ rules according to
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the realization of the taste shock. The cut-oﬀ levels, , , and ¯ partition the set of
taste shocks into four regions. For shocks lower than , a buyer deposits money at
the deposit facility. For values between  and , the buyer does not use the standing
facilities. For shocks higher than , the non-active buyer borrows and, finally, the
cut-oﬀ value ¯ determines whether his collateral constraint is binding or not.
Decisions by active buyers An active −buyer can borrow or lend at the money
market rate  and use the standing facilities. The indirect utility function ( | )
of such a buyer is
( | ) = max  () +  (+  +  −  −     )
s.t. +  +  −  −  ≥ 0 −  −  ≥ 0 and −  −  ≥ 0.
The first inequality is the buyer’s budget constraint in the goods market. The second
inequality is the collateral constraint associated with the choice of , and the third
inequality is the collateral constraint associated with the choice of . Let +
denote the Lagrange multiplier for the first inequality, + denote the Lagrange
multiplier of the second inequality, and + denote the Lagrange multiplier for the
third inequality.
In the above optimization problem, we set  = 0 and  = 0 because active
buyers never use the standing facilities if     . They use the deposit facility
if and only if  =  and the borrowing facility if and only if  = . For brevity
of our analysis, in the characterization below we ignore these two cases by assuming
    .
If     , we can use (8) to write the first-order conditions for  and  as
follows:
0 ()− + ¡1 +  ¢ = 0
−1 +
¡
1 + 
¢−  = 0 (14)
Lemma 2 characterizes the optimal borrowing and lending decisions and the quan-
tity of goods obtained by an active −buyer:
Lemma 2 There exist critical values , ¯, with 0 ≤  ≤ ¯, such that the following
is true: if 0 ≤   , an active buyer lends money in the money market; if  
 ≤ ¯, he borrows money and the collateral constraint is nonbinding; if ¯ ≤ , he
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borrows money and the collateral constraint is binding. The critical values in the
money market solve
 = +, and ¯ = + + +. (15)
Furthermore, the amount of borrowing and lending by an active buyer with a taste
shock  and the amount of goods purchased by the buyer satisfy:
 = ,  =  (− ) , if 0 ≤  ≤ 
 = ,  =  (− ) , if  ≤  ≤ ¯,
 = ¯  =  if ¯ ≤ 
(16)
Figure 2 illustrates consumption quantities by active and non-active buyers. The
black dotted linear curve (the 45—degree line) plots the first-best quantities. Con-
sumption quantities by active buyers are increasing in  in the interval  ∈ [0 ¯)
and are flat for  ≥ ¯. Note that initially the slope of the green curve is equal to
 ≤ 1, which means that the quantities consumed by active buyers are always
below the first-best quantities, unless  = . In contrast, the non-active buyers
consume the eﬃcient quantities in the interval [0 ]. The reason is that, although
they face the opportunity cost 1 when choosing the optimal consumption quantity,
the sellers pass over the interest payment they obtain at the deposit facility, which
exactly compensates for this; see equation (10).
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Figure 2: Consumption by active and non-active buyers.
4 Equilibrium
We focus on symmetric stationary equilibria with strictly positive demands for nom-
inal government bonds and money. Such equilibria meet the following requirements:
(i) Households’ decisions are optimal, given prices; (ii) The decisions are symmetric
across all sellers, symmetric across all active buyers with the same preference shock,
and symmetric across all non-active buyers with the same preference shock; (iii) All
markets clear; (iv) All real quantities are constant across time; (v) The consolidated
government budget constraint (3) holds in each period.
Market clearing in the goods market requires
 −
Z ∞
0
 () = 0 (17)
where  is aggregate production by sellers in the goods market.
To understand the role of market segmentation and the role of the standing fa-
cilities to complete the market, we first consider a laissez-faire money market where
the central bank oﬀers   1 and  = 0. In this case, no agent uses these facilities.
Let  denote the rate that would clear the money market under laissez-faire. From
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Lemma 2, the laissez-faire supply of money satisfies
 () = 
Z
0
 ( − )  ()
and the laissez-faire demand for money satisfies
 () = 
¯Z

 (− )  () + 
∞Z
¯
 () 
where  =   , ¯ =
³
 
´
(1 + B). Laissez-faire market clearing requires
 () =  ()  (18)
This is the market rate that would prevail under laissez-faire.
Suppose now  ≤ 1 and   0 and suppose (18) yields   ; i.e., the deposit
rate is higher than the laissez-faire money market rate. In this case, buyers prefer
to deposit at the central bank, which reduces the supply of money until  = .
Thus, if  ()   (), we must have  = . Along the same lines, suppose
(18) yields   . In this case, buyers prefer to borrow at the central bank, which
reduces the demand for money until  = . Thus, if  ()   (), we must
have  = . Finally, if     , buyers prefer to trade in the money market
and so  = .
Accordingly, we can formulate the market-clearing condition as follows:
 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 if  ()   ()
 if  ()   ()
 otherwise.
(19)
Let  ≡ + denote the constant gross money growth rate, let  ≡ +
denote the constant gross bond growth rate, and let B ≡  denote the bonds-to-
money ratio. We assume there are positive initial stocks of money0 and government
bonds 0.17
17Since the assets are nominal objects, the government and the central bank can start the economy
oﬀ with one-time injections of cash 0 and bonds 0.
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Lemma 3 In any stationary equilibrium, the bond-to-money ratio B has to be con-
stant, and this can be achieved only when the growth rates of money and bonds are
equal.
According to Lemma 3, in any stationary equilibrium the stock of money and
the stock of bonds must grow at the same rate. This result follows from the budget
constraints of the buyers. By definition, in a stationary equilibrium, all real quantities
are constant. Consider, for example, a non-active buyer who, according to Lemma
1, does not use the central bank’s standing facilities. His budget constraint satisfies
 = +. Symmetry requires that  = +, which implies that the real
stock of money ++ must be constant. Consider, next, a buyer who, according
to Lemma 1, is constrained by his bond holdings. His budget constraint satisfies
 = ¡++ +¢ . Then, since + is constant, the real quantity of bonds
+ must be constant, since in a symmetric equilibrium  = +. The result that
++ and ++ are constant implies  = . Finally, note that the gross inflation
rate + in the goods market is equal to . This follows from the seller’s first-order
condition (10).
The result of Lemma 3 raises an interesting question. Since the growth rate of
bonds  is chosen by the government and the growth rate of money  by the central
bank, the question is: Who is in charge? A related issue is discussed in Sargent and
Wallace (1981). They show that if fiscal policy is dominant (chosen first), then the
central bank may lose control over the inflation rate. In our context, if the government
chooses , then the central bank must follow by setting  = . Conversely, if the
central bank chooses , then the government must choose  = . Even though these
considerations are interesting, for the optimal policy that we will present below it does
not matter which agency is dominant. We, therefore, assume that the government
chooses , which forces the central bank to choose  = . It then follows that the
remaining policy variables of the central bank are  and .
Proposition 1 A symmetric stationary equilibrium with a positive demand for money
and bonds is a policy ( ) and endogenous variables (    ¯  ¯) satisfy-
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ing (19) and
 = 
"
¯R
0
()  () +
∞R
¯
() (¯)  ()
#
+(1− )
"
R
0
 () +
R

()  () +
¯R

()  ()
+
∞R
¯
(¯) ()  ()
# (20)
 = 
"
¯R
0
 () + ∞R
¯
(¯)  ()
#
+(1− )
" ¯R
0
 () +
∞R
¯
(¯)  ()
# (21)
 =  () , ¯ =  (1 + B)   =  () , and ¯ =  (1 + B)  (22)
Equation (20) is obtained from the choice of money holdings (6). Equation (21)
is obtained from (6) and (7); in any equilibrium with a strictly positive demand for
money and bonds,   ( ) =   ( ). We then use this arbitrage equation to
derive (21). Finally, equations (22) are derived from the budget constraints of the
buyers.
5 Optimal Policy
Proposition 2 The optimal policy is to set  = . This policy implements the
first-best allocation. Under the optimal policy, the settlement and money market prices
satisfy  =  = .
Note that the optimal policy ( ) is not unique, since under the optimal policy
 is irrelevant. The reason is that under the optimal policy the buyers never borrow.
Accordingly, any value of  ≤  is consistent with the optimal policy. Therefore,
under the optimal policy, the central bank can operate a floor system or a channel
system. They both yield the first-best allocation.
The optimal policy makes holding money costless and therefore satiates money
demand as described by the Friedman rule. Note that such a policy means that the
settlement market price  and the central bank’s ask price  exactly compensate
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market participants for their impatience and for inflation. Under this policy, the rate
of return on money is the same as the rate of return on government bonds. Hence,
they have the same marginal liquidity value, which is zero.18
In summary, the optimal monetary policy satisfies the Friedman rule and takes
the form of the central bank paying interest on deposits of central bank money. We
are clearly not the first to point out that the Friedman rule can take the form of
paying interest on deposits. For example, in Section 2.4.1, the textbook of Walsh
(2010) states that the Friedman rule can be achieved by paying interest on money.
Another example for this result can be found in chapter 6 of the book by Nosal and
Rocheteau (2011). Finally, Andolfatto (2010), Lagos (2010a), and Williamson (2012)
derive results on the optimality and implementation of the Friedman rule in search
theoretical models of money. In Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) the same policy satiates
the demand for central bank reserves. The novel results of our paper are presented
in Proposition 3 below.
Under the optimal policy, no one borrows from the standard facility, but there
are deposits. The question is how are these interest payments on deposits financed?
Corollary 1 The optimal policy requires that D  0.
The optimal policy requires that the government runs a primary surplus (D  0).
Therefore, it must collect taxes and hand them over to the central bank to finance
the interest payments on deposits. To see this, from (1) the central bank’s surplus is
S =+ − + (1 − 1)− (1 − 1)
Under the optimal policy (see the proof of Proposition 2),  = 0 and  =  .
Accordingly, the central bank’s surplus is
S =+ −
The remaining question is whether the central bank can attain a positive surplus
by printing money. Since in steady state + =  and under the optimal policy
18Since the first-best quantities are  =  with the support of  being unbounded, the real value
of money approaches infinity; i.e., the price level approaches zero. Any finite upper bound would
yield a finite, strictly positive price level.
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1 = , the central bank’s surplus is
S = () ( − 1)  0 (23)
Under the optimal policy, the central bank makes a deficit, which requires a transfer
of funds equal to () ( − 1) from the government to the central bank in each
period. From the consolidated budget constraint, it then requires that the government
has a primary surplus.
One can think of two ways out of this problem. First, the central bank is endowed
with a stock of real assets that provide suﬃcient revenue in each period to cover
the losses that occur under the optimal policy. Second, the central bank can be
endowed with a stock of government bonds that pay suﬃcient interest to cover the
losses described above. We discuss these possibilities in Section 7.
6 Constrained-optimal Policy
In the previous section, we showed that under the optimal policy the central bank
makes a deficit; i.e., S≡  ( − 1)  0. This requires a transfer of funds from the
government to the central bank in each period. In this section, we assume that the
central bank does not receive enough funds to run the optimal policy. Receiving less
funds implies that S  S.19
Since we find it more intuitive, we phrase the next proposition and our discussion
of it in terms of the deposit rate  and the loan rate , instead of the ask price 
and the bid price . For what follows, let ∗ =  − 1 denote the deposit rate that
implements the first-best allocation.
Proposition 3 If S  S, the constrained-optimal policy is to choose a strictly pos-
itive interest rate spread   with   ∗.
In the proof of Proposition 3, we show that the constrained optimal policy requires
that   ∗ and that increasing  is strictly welfare improving. The reason is that
paying interest on "idle" money holdings improves economic eﬃciency (see Berentsen
et al. (2007)). Thus, fiscal considerations are the reason why the central bank chooses
  ∗, since without suﬃcient funds it is not able to set  = ∗.
19Note that this constraint includes the case where the central bank makes a surplus (S  0), as
is the case for most central banks.
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Note that the constraint S  S does not mean that the central bank is unable
to run a floor system. It can always choose  =   ∗. Rather, it means that
it is not optimal to do so. By marginally increasing , the central bank makes it
relatively more costly to turn bonds into money and hence consumption. This aﬀects
the portfolio choice of agents in the settlement market. Most importantly, the demand
for money increases; and, since the nominal quantity of money is given, the real value
of money increases.20 For those who are not borrowing-constrained (for non-active
buyers with  ∈ [ ¯]) the higher marginal borrowing cost lowers their consumption
at the margin. However, starting from  = , this welfare loss is of second order.
For those who are borrowing-constrained (for non-active buyers with   ¯) the
marginal higher borrowing cost has no eﬀect on their consumption, yet their higher
real balances allow them to consume more. Starting from  = , this welfare gain is
of first order, and so the overall eﬀect is strictly positive.
Another way to explain this is as follows. Without central bank intervention,
only a fraction  of agents have access to the money market. By setting a floor
system with  =  = , the central bank completes the market since all agents can
trade at rate . This intervention has two eﬀects. First, the central bank provides
insurance against the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks  for the non-active buyers. On
the other hand, by insuring these agents, it reduces the demand for money ex-ante
and thus decreases its value. Increasing the loan rate  marginally removes some
of that insurance and increases the demand for money and its value. Thus, the key
result of Proposition 3 is that it is not optimal to complete the market, unless the
Friedman rule is feasible.
20In fact, in the proof of Proposition 3 we show that the real value of money is increasing in .
This result is related to Berentsen et al. (2013), who show in a related environment that restricting
access to financial markets can be welfare improving. The reason for this result is that in their
environment the portfolio choices of agents exhibit a pecuniary externality and that this externality
can be so strong that the optimal policy response is to reduce the frequency at which agents can
trade in financial markets.
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Figure 3: Welfare eﬀects from increasing .
Figure 3 graphically illustrates why increasing the loan rate is welfare improving.
The black dotted linear curve (the 45—degree line) plots the first-best consumption
quantities. The red curve (labeled zero corridor) plots the consumption quantities
for non-active buyers when  = . Up to , they receive the first-best consump-
tion quantities after which the collateral constraint is binding, as indicated by the
consumption quantities that are independent of . The blue curve (labeled positive
corridor) plots the quantities for non-active buyers when   . Up to the critical
value , they consume the first-best quantities; i.e.,  = . For  ∈ [0 ] they de-
posit any excess money at the deposit facility. For  ∈ [ ] they neither deposit nor
borrow money. They simply spend all money brought into the period and consume
 = . For  ∈ [ ¯] they borrow, but their collateral constraints are non-binding.
Finally, for   ¯ the collateral constraints are binding.
As indicated by Figure 3, increasing  lowers the consumption of non-active
medium -buyers and increases the consumption of non-active high- buyers. The
first eﬀect lowers welfare, while the second increases welfare. In the proof of Propo-
sition 3, we show that, starting from  = , the net gain is always positive.
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7 Discussion
We have previously established that under the optimal policy, the central bank makes
a deficit, which requires a transfer of funds from the government to the central bank
in each period. One can think of two ways out of this problem. First, the central bank
is endowed with a stock of real assets that provide suﬃcient revenue in each period
to cover the losses that occur under the optimal policy. Second, the central bank is
endowed with a stock of government bonds that pay suﬃcient interest to cover the
losses described above.
In what follows we amend the central bank’s balance sheet with real assets or
nominal bonds.
Nominal Bonds Let us assume the central bank holds government bonds. Let
 be the stock of government bonds held by the central bank, and let  be the
stock of bonds held by private agents. Then, the total stock of bonds in circulation
is  =  +. The bond-augmented central bank’s surplus is therefore
S =+ − + (1 − 1)− (1 − 1) − + + 
Substituting S into (2) yields
D =+ − + (1 − 1)− (1 − 1) + + −
which is identical to the consolidated government budget constraint (3). Conse-
quently, the result in Proposition 3 is not aﬀected. What matters for the consolidated
budget constraint is the total stock of bonds in circulation and not the stock of bonds
in the hands of the central bank.
Endowing the central bank with government bonds is simply a way to hide transfer
payments from the government to the central bank. In this case, the government has
to levy taxes to finance interest payments on the government bonds, which it then
hands over to the central bank. The central bank, then uses these funds to pay
interest on reserves. In practice, this means it pays considerable sums to private
sector banks, which can be politically problematic, as argued in the introduction.
The literature on paying interest on reserves is largely unconcerned with this point.
For example, Goodfriend (2002, p.5) argues "Suppose a central bank such as the Fed
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confines its asset purchases mainly to Treasury securities. In that case, interest on the
increase in reserves will be self-financing if there is a positive spread between longer
term Treasury securities and the rate of interest on reserves. Reserve balances at
the central bank paying market interest are like one-day Treasury securities. Hence,
interest rate spreads between longer term Treasury securities and overnight deposits
at the central bank should exhibit term premia ordinarily reflected in the Treasury
yield curve. Therefore, a central bank such as the Fed should be able to self-finance
interest on the enlarged demand for reserves in the new regime. In fact, the net
interest spread earned on new assets acquired in the interest-and-reserves regime
would raise additional revenue for the central bank."
Goodfriend’s (2002) argues that the central bank can pay interest on reserves
and always make a profit. This occurs by exploiting an exogenously given, positively
sloped yield curve — the central bank can issue short maturity reserves and buy
long maturity assets. The diﬀerence in returns is profit for the central bank that
gets returned to the Treasury. However, in general equilibrium, the yield curve is an
endogenous object — one cannot simply assume it has a particular slope. Furthermore,
Goodfriend’s argument raises the following question: why not exploit this ad infinitum
to maximize revenue for the Treasury?
In any case, Goodfriend’s (2002) arguments obscure the fact that running a floor
system is costly to the tax-payer. Any interest payment handed over to a private
bank cannot be handed over to the treasury. The treasury could use that dollar to
reduce the tax burden or to finance some other public good. No reasonable econo-
mist can dispute this fact and this is true in and out of steady state and it is also
true independent of the asset side of the central bank. This is the unpleasant fiscal
arithmetic of a floor system.
Real assets Let  be the nominal stock of real assets in the central bank’s balance
sheet and  the rate of return on these assets. Then, the real—asset-augmented central
bank’s surplus is
S =+ − + (1 − 1)− (1 − 1) +  (24)
Using the last equation, the consolidated government budget constraint (2), is
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given by
D =+ − + (1 − 1)− (1 − 1) + + − +  (25)
Let K ≡  denote the real—asset-to-money ratio and K¯ ≡ ( + B) (1− )  
0.
Proposition 4 The optimal policy generates no losses for the central bank if K ≥ K¯.
According to Proposition 4, the central bank can operate the optimal floor system
if it has a suﬃciently large stock of real assets. The income generated by these assets
is then used to finance the interest payments on reserves. Note that this condition
is more likely to be violated if: 1)  is too low, 2) inflation, , is too high, or 3) the
ratio of bonds to money, B, is too large. Thus, having a significant holding of real
assets may still not be suﬃcient to avoid having to receive fiscal transfers under the
optimal floor system.21
8 Conclusions
Despite the growing use of channel or floor systems to implement monetary policy,
only a few theoretical studies exist. In particular, there are no formal studies that
compare the two systems. This paper attempts to close this gap by constructing a
general equilibrium model, where a central bank chooses to conduct monetary policy
via either a floor system or a channel system. Unlike the existing literature, we
explicitly take into account the financial implications of paying interest on deposits.
The following results emerge from our analysis. First, the optimal framework is
a floor system if and only if the target rate satisfies the Friedman rule. Second,
implementing the optimal floor system is costly for the central bank. It requires that
the central bank either has suﬃcient income to incur the interest expense or receives
transfers from the fiscal authority. In either case, fewer resources are available to
the government to finance its other priorities, which may lead to a political backlash
and restrictions on the central bank’s ability to pay interest on reserves. This is the
21Having assets with insuﬃciently low interest rates is exactly the situation Costa Rica has faced
for the past 20 years; its interest-earning assets do not generate enough income to pay the interest
on its liabilities. Consequently, the central bank must get annual transfers of revenue from the
Treasury.
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unpleasant fiscal arithmetic of a floor system. Third, if the central bank is constrained
by the fiscal authority regarding the size of its interest expense, a channel system is
optimal. This last result does not mean that the central bank cannot implement a
floor system, since it can always set the loan rate equal to the deposit rate, implying
that the money market rate is equal to the deposit rate. Such a floor system, however,
is suboptimal and the central bank can always do better by choosing a channel system
instead.
In a nutshell, our paper provides a rationale for operating a channel system as
opposed to a floor system. Our explanation rests on the idea that central banks may
be unable, or are unwilling for political reasons, to incur the interest expense required
by the optimal floor system.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We first derive the cut-oﬀ values  and . For this proof, we
add a subscript  to the notation of the consumption level of a buyer if the non-active
buyer deposits money at the central bank, a subscript  if the buyer takes out a loan
and the collateral constraint is nonbinding, a subscript ¯ if the buyer takes out a loan
and the collateral constraint is binding, and a subscript 0 if the buyer does neither.
From (11), the consumption level of a buyer who enters the goods market satisfies
 () = + ,  () =

+ . (26)
A buyer who does not use the deposit facilities will spend all his money on goods,
since, if he anticipated that he would have idle cash after the goods trade, it would
be optimal to deposit the idle cash in the intermediary, provided   1. Thus,
consumption of such a buyer is
0 () =  . (27)
At  = , the household is indiﬀerent between depositing and not depositing. We
can write this indiﬀerence condition as
 ()− + [ − (1 − 1) ] =  (0)− +0.
By using (26), (27), and  = − , we can write the equation further as

∙ 
+
¸
=  − +.
The unique solution to this equation is  = +, which implies that +  .
At  = , the household is indiﬀerent between borrowing and not borrowing. We
can write this indiﬀerence condition as
 ()− + [ + (1 − 1) ] =  (0)− +0.
Using (26), (27), and  =  −, we can write this equation further as

∙ 
+
¸
=  − +
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The unique solution to this equation is  = +. Using the expression for 
we get
 =  ()  (28)
We now calculate ¯. There is a critical buyer who enters the goods market and
wants to take out a loan, whose collateral constraint is just binding. From (11), for
this buyer we have the following equilibrium conditions: ¯ = ¯+ and ¯ = +.
Eliminating ¯ we get
¯ = + + +
Using (28) we get
¯ = 
µ
1 +  
¶

It is then evident that
0 ≤  ≤  ≤ ¯
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof of Lemma 2 is very similar to the proof of Lemma
1 and is omitted.
Proof of Lemma 3. A stationary equilibrium requires that all real quantities are
constant and symmetry requires that  = + and  = +. From Lemma 1, there
are two critical consumption quantities in our model:
 =  = ++ if  ≤  ≤ 
 = ¯ =
¡++ + ++¢  if ¯ ≤ 
The first quantity requires that the real stock of money is constant; i.e.,  = ++,
implying that + = .
Since ++ is constant, the second quantity requires that ++ is constant too;
i.e.,  = ++. This implies that the stock of bonds has to grow at the same rate
as the stock of money.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof involves deriving equations (20), (21), and
(22).
Equations (22) are derived in the proof of Lemma 1. To derive equation (20),
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diﬀerentiate (9) with respect to  to get
  ( ) = 
∞Z
0
£  (+  +  −  −     | ) + + ¤  ()
+ (1− )
∞Z
0
£  (+  +  −  −     | ) + +¤  () 
Then, use (8) to replace   , (11) to replace +, and (14) to replace + to
obtain
  ( ) = 
∞Z
0
0 ()
  () + (1− )
∞Z
0
0 ()
  ()  (29)
Note that the two integrals are not equal since the quantities  diﬀer for active and
non-active buyers. Use the first-order condition (10) to replace  to get
  ( ) =
¡+¢
⎡
⎣
∞Z
0
0 ()  () + (1− )
∞Z
0
0 ()  ()
⎤
⎦ 
Use (6) to replace   ( ) and replace + by  to get

 = 
∞Z
0
0 ()  () + (1− )
∞Z
0
0 ()  () 
Finally, note that 0 () = 1 and replace the quantities  of the first integral using
Lemma 2 and the quantities  of the second integral using Lemma 1 to get (20),
which we replicate here:

 = 
⎡
⎣
¯Z
0

 () +
∞Z
¯

¯

 ()
⎤
⎦ (30)
+(1− )
⎡
⎢⎣
Z
0
 () +
Z


 () +
¯Z


  () +
∞Z
¯

¯

  ()
⎤
⎥⎦ 
where  =   , ¯ =
³
 
´
(1 + B),  =   , ¯ =
³
 
´
(1 + B). Note
33
that if  = 0, then (30) yields , since no other endogenous variables are contained
in (30). To see this, replace  and ¯ by   and
³
 
´
(1 + B), respectively.
To derive (21), note that in any equilibrium with a strictly positive demand for
money and bonds, we must have   ( ) =   ( ). We now use this arbitrage
equation to derive (21). We have already derived   ( ) in (29). To get   ( )
diﬀerentiate  ( ) with respect to  and note that + = 0 to get
  ( ) = 
∞Z
0
£  (+  −  −    | ) + + ¤  ()
+ (1− )
∞Z
0
£  (+  −  −    | ) + +¤  () 
Use (8) to replace   to get
  ( ) = +
∞Z
0
¡
1 + 
¢  () + (1− )+ ∞Z
0
(1 + )  () 
Use (11) to replace , (14) to replace  , and rearrange to get
  ( ) = 
⎡
⎣
¯Z
0
+ () +
∞Z
¯

0 ()
  ()
⎤
⎦
+(1− )
⎡
⎢⎣
¯Z
0
+ () +
∞Z
¯
 
0 ()
  ()
⎤
⎥⎦ 
Use (10) to replace  to get
  ( ) = 
⎡
⎣
¯Z
0
+ () +
∞Z
¯
+ () 0 ()  ()
⎤
⎦
+(1− )
⎡
⎢⎣
¯Z
0
+ () +
∞Z
¯
+ () 0 ()  ()
⎤
⎥⎦ 
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Equate   ( ) =   ( ) and simplify to get

∞Z
0
0 ()  () + (1− )
∞Z
0
0 ()  ()
= 
⎡
⎣
¯Z
0
()  () +
∞Z
¯
() 0 ()  ()
⎤
⎦
+(1− )
⎡
⎢⎣
¯Z
0
()  () +
∞Z
¯
() 0 ()  ()
⎤
⎥⎦ 
Note that 
∞R
0
0 ()  () + (1− )
∞R
0
0 ()  () =  and rearrange to get

 = 
⎡
⎣
¯Z
0
 () +
∞Z
¯
() 0 ()  ()
⎤
⎦
+(1− )
⎡
⎢⎣
¯Z
0
 () +
∞Z
¯
() 0 ()  ()
⎤
⎥⎦ 
Finally, use Lemmas 1 and 2 to get (21), which we replicate here:

 = 
⎡
⎣
¯Z
0
 () +
∞Z
¯
(¯)  ()
⎤
⎦+ (1− )
⎡
⎢⎣
¯Z
0
 () +
∞Z
¯
(¯)  ()
⎤
⎥⎦ 
Note that if  = 0,  depends on  only since  =   and ¯ =
³
 
´
(1 + B).
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Proof of Proposition 2. Set  = . Then, (20) reduces as follows:
1 = 
"
¯R
0
[ ()]  () +
∞R
¯
[ ()] (¯)  ()
#
+(1− )
"
R
0
 () +
R

()  () +
¯R

[ ()]  ()
+
∞R
¯
(¯) [ ()]  ()
#

This equation can hold if and only if  →∞ and  → . To see this, note that
[ ()] ≥ 1, [ ()] (¯) ≥ 1 for  ≥ ¯, () ≥ 1 for  ≥ , [ ()] ≥ 1,
and (¯) [ ()] ≥ 1 for  ≥ ¯. Accordingly, the right-hand side is larger or equal
to one. Then,  →∞ implies  ¯  ¯ →∞ from (22). Accordingly, for  →∞
above equation approaches
1 =  ∞R
0
[ ()]  () + (1− )
∞R
0
 () 
which implies that  →  as  → ∞. Thus, from Lemma 1, the first-best
allocation  =  for all  is attained. Moreover, from (21), it is clear that the
settlement market rate must satisfy  = .
Proof of Corollary 1. We now show that the optimal policy requires that the
government has a primary surplus D  0. In any equilibrium, the sellers’ money
holdings satisfy
 = + − (1− )
Z
0
( − )  () 
The left-hand side is the aggregate money receipts of sellers. The right-hand side is
the beginning of period quantity of money,  ; plus aggregate lending of money by
the central bank, ; minus deposits by non-active buyers at the central bank. These
buyers simply deposit any "idle" money to receive interest on it. Furthermore, in any
equilibrium aggregate deposits satisfy
 =  + (1− )
Z
0
( − )  () 
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where  is deposits by sellers. These two equations imply that in any equilibrium,
total deposits satisfy
 = +  (31)
From Lemma 1, we know that only non-active buyers with a shock  ≥  borrow
from the central bank. Thus, aggregate lending is  = (1− ) ∞R

 (). From
Lemma 1, we also know that  =  [() − ] if  ≤  ≤ ¯, and  =  =
 [() ¯ − ] if  ≥ ¯. Thus, real aggregate lending is
 = (1− )Ψ (32)
where
Ψ ≡
¯Z

[() − ]  () +
∞Z
¯
[() ¯ − ]  () 
Divide both sides of (25) by  to get
D
 =  − 1−
(1 − 1) − (1 − 1)
 − B (1− ) 
Eliminating  and  using (31) and (32), respectively, and noting that  = ,
the last expression can be rewritten as follows:
D
 =  − 1 −
(1 − 1) (1− )Ψ
 − B (1− )  (33)
Finally, under the optimal policy  =  we have  = . Replacing  and  by
 and noting that Ψ = 0 under the optimal policy yields
D
 = ( + B) ( − 1) ≤ 0
Thus, the optimal policy requires that the government generates a primary surplus.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Let ∗ =  denote the deposit factor that implements the first-best allocation.
The proof involves showing that if S  S, it is not optimal to operate a floor system
with  =   ∗, where ∗ is the deposit rate under the optimal policy. The
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proof involves two steps. First, we show that in a floor system, where  = , the
constraint S  S implies  =   ∗. Second, we show that if  =   ∗, it is
optimal to choose a non-zero corridor by increasing the loan rate marginally, i.e., by
decreasing  marginally.
First step. From (1), in any equilibrium the surplus satisfies
S =+ − + (1 − 1)− (1 − 1)
In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that in any equilibrium,  =  + , which
allows us to write the previous equation as follows:
S = [ − 1 + (1 − 1) ]
where + = .
Under the optimal policy, we have shown that  = ∗ and  = 0, hence, we get
S = ( − 1∗)
In any other floor system, we have  =   ∗ and, therefore,
S = ( − 1)
This immediately implies that when S  S, then  =   ∗.
Second step. Here, we show that for any floor system with  =   ∗ it is
optimal to deviate and increase the loan rate marginally (i.e., decrease  marginally).
To do so, we calculate W and then evaluate it at  = .
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For convenience, let us rewrite the welfare function as follows:
W = 
⎡
⎣
¯Z
0
[ ()− ]  () +
∞Z
¯
[ ()− ]  ()
⎤
⎦
+(1− )
⎡
⎣
Z
0
[ ()− ]  () +
Z

[ ()− ]  () (34)
+
¯Z

[ ()− ]  () +
∞Z
¯
[ ()− ]  ()
⎤
⎥⎦ 
A change of the borrowing rate  aﬀects W directly, and indirectly via  and
. That is, W
 =
W
 +
W


 +
W


  (35)
The terms W ,
W
  and W satisfy
W
 = (1− )
⎡
⎢⎣
¯Z

µ
 − 1
¶ 
 ()+
∞Z
¯
[0 ()− 1] B ()
⎤
⎥⎦ (36)
W
 = 
⎡
⎣
∞Z
¯
[0 ()− 1] (1 + B)  ()
⎤
⎦ (37)
+(1− )
⎡
⎢⎣
Z

[0 ()− 1]  ()+
∞Z
¯
[0 ()− 1] (1 + B)  ()
⎤
⎥⎦
W
 = 
⎡
⎣
¯Z
0
µ 
 − 1
¶ 
 ()+
∞Z
¯
[0 ()− 1] B ()
⎤
⎦  (38)
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We get the derivative  by taking the total derivative of (20). Let
∇ ≡ 
⎡
⎣
∞Z
¯
00 () (1 + B) ()
⎤
⎦
+(1− )
⎡
⎢⎣
Z

00 ()  ()+
∞Z
¯
00 () (1 + B) ()
⎤
⎥⎦ 
From equation (20), we get

 = −

"
¯R
0
00 ()  ()+
∞R
¯
00 () B ()
#

∇ (39)
−
(1− )
" ¯R

00 ()  ()+
∞R
¯
00 () B ()
#
∇ 
We now evaluate (36), (37), (38), and (39) at  =  = . Note that when
 =  = ,  =  = , and ¯ = ¯ =  (1 + B). Moreover, for a given  the
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quantities consumed by an active and a passive buyer are equal. We get
W

¯¯¯¯
==
= (1− )
∞Z
¯
[0 ()− 1] B ()
W

¯¯¯¯
==
=
∞Z
¯
[0 ()− 1] (1 + B)  () 
W

¯¯¯¯
==
= 
∞Z
¯
[0 ()− 1] B ()


¯¯¯¯
==
= −

" ¯R
0
00 ()  ()+
∞R
¯
00 () B ()
#

∞R
¯
00 () (1 + B) ()
−
(1− )
" ¯R

00 ()  ()+
∞R
¯
00 () B ()
#
∞R
¯
00 () (1 + B) ()

We can now use the above expressions to rewrite (35) as follows:
W

¯¯¯¯
==
= −
 ¯R
0
00 ()  ()  + (1− )
¯R

00 ()  ()"
∞R
¯
[0 ()− 1]  ()
#−1 ∞R
¯
00 ()  ()

The numerator and denominator are negative. Since  ≥ 0 ( cannot decrease
since it is equal to the deposit rate), W  0, which implies that decreasing 
(increasing ) marginally from  =  =  is welfare improving.
Proof of Proposition 4. Divide both sides of (25) by  to get
D
 =  − 1 +
(1 − 1)− (1 − 1)
 − B (1− ) + K
Eliminating  and  using (31) and (32), respectively, and noting that  = ,
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the last expression becomes
D
 =  − 1 −
(1 − 1) (1− )Ψ
 − B (1− ) + K (40)
Optimal policy requires  =  = . Replacing  and  by  and noting that
Ψ = 0 under the optimal policy yields
D
 = ( + B) ( − 1) + K
Thus, the optimal policy generates no losses for the central bank (D  0) if and only
if K ≥ K¯, where K¯ ≡ ( + B) (1− ) 
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